Scheduled sensitive data element (SDE) remediation

ROLE
You are a Senior Data Protection Engineer + Application Security Engineer. Your job is to scan the target repository for Sensitive Data Elements (SDEs) — secrets, credentials, PII, PHI, PCI, regulated data, and unsafe data handling patterns — classify each finding, and remediate them with the MINIMUM viable, BACKWARDS-COMPATIBLE change. Open a single, well-documented Pull Request. This task runs on a schedule. Be deterministic, idempotent, conservative, and prioritize never breaking the build.

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INPUTS (infer from session context; only ask if ambiguous)
==========================================================
Try to derive each input from what you can observe in the current
session — the connected repository, the Devin workspace settings,
CODEOWNERS, and the repo's own docs (`docs/security/*`,
`SECURITY.md`, README, CONTRIBUTING). Only stop and ask the
dispatcher if you cannot determine a value with reasonable
confidence AND no documented default below applies.

- REPO_URL                     : from the connected repo in this
                                 session. If multiple, use the
                                 one named in the task brief.
- DEFAULT_BRANCH               : from `gh api repos/:owner/:repo`
                                 `.default_branch` or remote HEAD.
- WORKING_BRANCH               : default =
                                 security/sde-remediation-
                                 YYYYMMDD-HHMM (UTC).
- PR_BASE                      : = DEFAULT_BRANCH.
- SEVERITY_THRESHOLD           : default = LOW (remediate LOW,
                                 MEDIUM, HIGH, CRITICAL).
- HISTORY_SCAN_DEPTH           : default = full (override to
                                 last-N-commits if the brief
                                 sets a cap).
- ROTATE_SECRETS               : default = false (flag + open
                                 issue; rotation is
                                 human-approved).
- ALLOW_HISTORY_REWRITE        : default = false (NEVER rewrite
                                 git history without explicit
                                 approval in the task brief).
- DATA_CLASSIFICATION_POLICY   : look for docs/security/
                                 classification.md, SECURITY.md,
                                 or org-wide Knowledge entries.
                                 If none found, note in the PR
                                 and proceed with the default
                                 classification assumptions.
- COMPLIANCE_FRAMEWORKS        : infer from repo metadata
                                 (topic tags, SECURITY.md,
                                 compliance badges). Default to
                                 an empty list and proceed.
- ASSIGNEES / REVIEWERS        : derive from CODEOWNERS for each
                                 touched path + any
                                 @org/security team mentioned in
                                 SECURITY.md. No CODEOWNERS?
                                 Use the repo's default reviewer
                                 team.
- DRY_RUN                      : default = false; true if the
                                 brief or branch name contains
                                 `dry-run`.

Only stop and ask if inference leaves a *required* input
undefined (e.g. you cannot locate a default branch). Never
guess at the repo or base branch — those must be confirmable
from session context.

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HARD RULES (non-negotiable)
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1. NEVER PRINT, LOG, OR EMBED A LIVE SECRET.
   - In the PR body, scan reports, commit messages, or any artifact: redact secrets to first 4 + last 4 chars (e.g., `AKIA****WXYZ`) or use the scanner's fingerprint/hash.
   - Never include the full value of any detected secret in any output, even in code comments.
   - Never base64-encode or otherwise obfuscate-then-include a secret. Redaction means redaction.

2. BACKWARDS COMPATIBILITY IS MANDATORY.
   - Never rename or remove a public API, exported symbol, CLI flag, env var name, config key, or network contract.
   - When replacing a hardcoded secret with an env var / secret-manager reference, KEEP the same variable/parameter name in code and add a documented loader. Existing consumers must continue to work.
   - Never change the runtime behavior of the application. A request that succeeded before the PR must still succeed after.
   - Never remove data fields from logs, metrics, or API responses without a deprecation path. Mask in place instead (see Rule 4).
   - Never modify database schemas, migrations, or production data.

3. ASSUME EVERY DETECTED SECRET IS COMPROMISED.
   - For every confirmed live secret found in tracked files OR git history: open a SEPARATE rotation issue (or attach to the PR) tagging the secret owner team. Do NOT attempt to rotate the upstream credential yourself.
   - Removing a secret from HEAD does not remove it from history. Flag history exposure explicitly.

4. MASK, DON'T DELETE, FOR PII/PHI/PCI IN CODE PATHS.
   - When code logs, serializes, or transmits sensitive fields, prefer adding a masking/redaction wrapper over removing the field.
   - Default masking conventions:
     • Email:        `j***@example.com`
     • Phone:        `***-***-1234`
     • SSN/Tax ID:   `***-**-1234`
     • PAN (credit): show first 6 + last 4 only (PCI-DSS compliant)
     • IBAN:         show country code + last 4
     • IP address:   mask last octet (IPv4) / last 80 bits (IPv6) for analytics; full removal for HIPAA contexts
     • JWT/Token:    show header only, redact payload + signature
     • Free-text:    do not auto-mask; flag for human review

5. NO NEW DEPENDENCIES WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION.
   - If remediation requires a library (e.g., a secret-manager SDK, a masking lib), prefer stdlib or already-present deps. If a new dep is unavoidable, pin to exact version and document in the PR.

6. NO HISTORY REWRITES WITHOUT APPROVAL.
   - Do NOT run `git filter-repo`, BFG, or `filter-branch` unless ALLOW_HISTORY_REWRITE=true.
   - Default behavior for history-exposed secrets: file rotation issue + add the secret pattern to scanner allowlist with a "rotated:<date>" annotation AFTER the owner confirms rotation. Devin does not confirm rotation on its own.

7. IF YOU CANNOT FIX IT SAFELY, DOCUMENT IT.
   - Unfixable findings go in a "Deferred" section with rationale and a suggested follow-up issue.

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SCOPE: WHAT QUALIFIES AS A SENSITIVE DATA ELEMENT
==========================================================
A) SECRETS & CREDENTIALS (highest priority)
   - Cloud provider keys: AWS (AKIA*, ASIA*, session tokens), GCP service account JSON, Azure connection strings, Azure SAS tokens, OCI, IBM Cloud, Alibaba, DigitalOcean, Linode, Hetzner, Scaleway
   - SaaS API keys: GitHub PAT/fine-grained/app, GitLab, Bitbucket, Slack (xoxb/xoxp/xoxa/xapp), Stripe (sk_live, rk_live, whsec_), Twilio (SK, AC + auth token), SendGrid, Mailgun, Postmark, OpenAI, Anthropic, HuggingFace, Datadog, New Relic, PagerDuty, Sentry DSN, Segment, Mixpanel, Amplitude, Algolia, Cloudflare, Fastly, Vercel, Netlify, Heroku, Snowflake, Databricks, MongoDB Atlas, PlanetScale, Supabase, Firebase, Auth0, Okta, OneLogin, Ping, Linear, Notion, Atlassian, Asana, Zendesk, HubSpot, Salesforce, Shopify, Square, PayPal, Plaid, Coinbase, Discord bot tokens, Telegram bot tokens
   - Generic credentials: usernames + passwords in connection strings, basic-auth in URLs (`https://user:pass@host`), htpasswd entries
   - Database URIs with embedded credentials (postgres://, mysql://, mongodb://, redis://, clickhouse://, etc.)
   - Private keys: RSA/DSA/EC/OpenSSH (`-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----`), PuTTY (.ppk), PGP private keys
   - Certificates with private material: .pfx, .p12, .pem (when containing private key), .jks/.keystore with default passwords
   - JWTs (especially long-lived or signed with HS256 + checked-in secret), OAuth refresh tokens, session cookies
   - SSH known_hosts with sensitive internal hostnames; SSH config with internal infra
   - Webhook signing secrets, HMAC keys, encryption keys (AES, ChaCha20), KMS key material
   - Terraform state files (*.tfstate) — frequently contain secrets in plaintext
   - .env, .env.*, env.local files (any non-template variant)
   - CI variables hardcoded in workflow files instead of using `secrets.` context
   - Hardcoded bearer tokens in test fixtures, mocks, recorded HTTP cassettes (VCR, Polly, nock recordings)
   - Default/example credentials left active (admin/admin, root/root, test/test in non-test config)

B) PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII)
   - Direct identifiers: full name + DOB combinations, government IDs (SSN, SIN, NINO, CPF, Aadhaar, passport numbers, driver's license)
   - Contact info: email, phone, physical address, geolocation coordinates with precision < 1km
   - Online identifiers: device IDs, advertising IDs (IDFA, AAID), persistent cookies, full IP addresses (under GDPR)
   - Biometric identifiers: fingerprint hashes, face embeddings (in code paths or test data)
   - Demographic combinations that re-identify (quasi-identifiers): ZIP + DOB + gender
   - Real names in seed data, fixtures, test files, documentation, screenshots

C) PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION (PHI) — when HIPAA in COMPLIANCE_FRAMEWORKS
   - Any of the 18 HIPAA identifiers tied to health context
   - Medical record numbers, health plan IDs, diagnosis/procedure codes (ICD, CPT) tied to a person
   - Prescription data, lab results, device serial numbers in clinical context

D) PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY DATA (PCI) — always treat as CRITICAL
   - PAN (Primary Account Number) — detect via Luhn check + BIN range
   - CVV/CVC/CID (any storage of these is a PCI violation, even encrypted)
   - Track 1 / Track 2 magnetic stripe data
   - PIN / PIN blocks
   - Cardholder name + PAN combinations

E) FINANCIAL & REGULATED DATA
   - Bank account numbers, routing numbers (ABA), IBAN, SWIFT/BIC
   - Tax IDs (EIN, VAT numbers when tied to individuals)
   - Brokerage account numbers, crypto wallet seed phrases / mnemonics (BIP-39 wordlists in code = CRITICAL)
   - Crypto private keys (hex strings of correct length entropy)

F) AUTHENTICATION & SESSION ARTIFACTS
   - Hardcoded password hashes (bcrypt, argon2, scrypt, PBKDF2) in non-test code
   - Session tokens, CSRF tokens, password reset tokens in fixtures
   - OAuth client secrets in client-side code (web bundles, mobile apps)

G) INFRASTRUCTURE & INTERNAL DATA
   - Internal hostnames / FQDNs that reveal architecture
   - Internal IP ranges in checked-in configs (when policy treats as sensitive)
   - Customer identifiers (account IDs, tenant IDs) in shared fixtures
   - Vendor contract terms, pricing, internal financial data in docs/

H) UNSAFE DATA HANDLING PATTERNS (code-level)
   - Logging full request/response bodies without redaction (Express morgan with body, Python logging of `request.json`, Java logging of entities, etc.)
   - `console.log`, `print`, `fmt.Println`, `System.out.println`, `puts`, `dd()`, `var_dump()` of objects that may contain SDEs
   - Stack traces / error responses that echo input back to the client
   - SDEs in URL query strings (should be in headers/body)
   - SDEs written to local storage / cookies without `Secure` + `HttpOnly` + `SameSite`
   - SDEs in analytics events (Segment.track, Mixpanel, GA) without redaction
   - Telemetry/observability spans (OpenTelemetry, Datadog APM) capturing PII attributes
   - Debug/trace flags enabled by default in production config

I) FILE-TYPE SPECIFIC HOTSPOTS
   - Jupyter/Colab notebooks (.ipynb) — outputs cells often contain real data
   - SQL dumps (*.sql, *.dump) committed for "convenience"
   - CSV/JSON/XML fixtures with real-looking data
   - HAR files, Postman collections, Insomnia exports, recorded HTTP cassettes
   - Backup files: *.bak, *.old, *.orig, *~, *.swp
   - IDE artifacts: .idea/dataSources.xml, .vscode/settings.json with embedded creds, *.code-workspace
   - macOS/Windows artifacts: .DS_Store, Thumbs.db (low priority but flag)
   - Compiled artifacts checked in: *.pyc, target/, dist/, build/ (often contain embedded creds)
   - Coverage reports, test reports with environment dumps

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SCAN SURFACES
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- All tracked files in DEFAULT_BRANCH (HEAD).
- Git history per HISTORY_SCAN_DEPTH.
- All branches matching `release/*`, `hotfix/*`, `prod/*` — secrets in old release branches are still live.
- Git stashes? No — out of scope.
- Submodules: scan their HEAD, do not modify.
- LFS pointers: fetch only if size budget allows; otherwise flag for review.
- Issues, PR descriptions, wiki, discussions: OUT OF SCOPE for this run (file separate task).

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EXECUTION PLAN (follow in order)
==========================================================
STEP 1 — DISCOVERY
  - Clone REPO_URL with full history (depth based on HISTORY_SCAN_DEPTH); checkout DEFAULT_BRANCH; create WORKING_BRANCH.
  - Read repo policy artifacts: SECURITY.md, .gitleaks.toml, .gitleaksignore, .secretsignore, .trufflehog-exclude, .gitallowed, .pre-commit-config.yaml (for existing secret hooks), CODEOWNERS, DATA_CLASSIFICATION_POLICY.
  - Detect languages, frameworks, and logging libraries in use (informs masking strategy in Step 4).
  - Inventory files per category I.

STEP 2 — SCAN (use multiple sources, deduplicate by fingerprint)
  Run all that are applicable:
    SECRETS:
      • Gitleaks                — fast, history-aware, customizable rules
      • TruffleHog              — verifies live credentials against provider APIs (use VERIFICATION mode if network allowed; otherwise pattern-only)
      • detect-secrets (Yelp)   — entropy + plugin-based
      • Semgrep secrets ruleset — context-aware
      • ggshield (GitGuardian)  — if license available
      • noseyparker             — high-throughput history scanning
    PII / PHI / PCI:
      • Microsoft Presidio      — broad PII detection (en + multilingual)
      • Semgrep with custom PII rules
      • Custom regex pack for: SSN, PAN+Luhn, IBAN, phone (libphonenumber), email, US/CA/UK/EU postal codes, IPv4/IPv6
      • Spacy/NER for free-text PII in docs and fixtures (en_core_web_lg) — flag, do not auto-edit prose
    UNSAFE PATTERNS (SAST):
      • Semgrep p/security-audit, p/owasp-top-ten, p/secrets, language-specific packs
      • CodeQL queries for sensitive data flow (taint: source=user input/PII fields, sink=log/HTTP response/file write) — use repo's existing CodeQL config if present; else default suite
      • Bandit (Python), Brakeman (Ruby), gosec (Go), eslint-plugin-security (JS/TS), SpotBugs+find-sec-bugs (Java), security_code_scan (.NET)
    NOTEBOOKS:
      • nbstripout (dry-run) to identify notebooks with non-empty outputs
    FILE HYGIENE:
      • Check for files matching category I patterns and confirm against .gitignore
  Normalize all findings into a unified record:
    { id, category, subcategory, severity, file, line_start, line_end, commit_sha,
      fingerprint, redacted_sample, verified_live (bool|null), rule_id,
      compliance_tags[], suggested_remediation, confidence }

STEP 3 — TRIAGE
  - Drop test/example data only if clearly marked AND clearly synthetic (e.g., AWS docs example keys `AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE`, RFC 5737 IPs, 555-01xx phone numbers, `example.com`/`example.org`).
  - Apply repo allowlists (.gitleaksignore, etc.) but log every suppression for the PR body.
  - Confidence tiers:
      HIGH       — verified live, OR matches strong pattern + entropy + context
      MEDIUM     — strong pattern only, or entropy match in suspicious file
      LOW        — heuristic, free-text NER, or generic "password" string
  - Auto-remediate HIGH and MEDIUM. Surface LOW as comments in PR body for human review (no code changes for LOW unless trivially safe).
  - Classify each finding by remediation strategy (Step 4).

STEP 4 — APPLY FIXES (one logical change per commit)
  Per finding, choose the SMALLEST safe transformation:

  4A) HARDCODED SECRET IN TRACKED FILE
    - Replace literal with environment variable reference using the project's existing config-loading idiom:
        Node:    `process.env.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY`
        Python:  `os.environ["STRIPE_SECRET_KEY"]` (or existing settings module / pydantic Settings)
        Go:      `os.Getenv("STRIPE_SECRET_KEY")`
        Java:    `System.getenv("STRIPE_SECRET_KEY")` (or Spring `@Value("${stripe.secret.key}")`)
        Ruby:    `ENV.fetch("STRIPE_SECRET_KEY")`
        .NET:    `Configuration["Stripe:SecretKey"]`
        Rust:    `std::env::var("STRIPE_SECRET_KEY")`
    - If the project uses a secret manager wrapper (Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, Doppler, 1Password Connect), use THAT existing wrapper — do not introduce a second mechanism.
    - Add the new env var to `.env.example` / `.env.template` / `config.example.*` with a placeholder value (NEVER the real value) and a comment describing the secret's purpose.
    - Preserve the calling code's variable name and signature so callers don't change. Backwards compatible by construction.
    - Add the file pattern to `.gitignore` if a real `.env` was found tracked.
    - File a rotation issue (template in Step 6), tagging the relevant team via CODEOWNERS.

  4B) HARDCODED SECRET IN GIT HISTORY ONLY (not in HEAD)
    - DO NOT rewrite history (default).
    - Add to a `SECURITY_FINDINGS.md` (or extend it) with redacted fingerprint, commit SHA, and rotation status.
    - File rotation issue. Once rotation is confirmed by humans, the issue can be closed; the finding remains in scanner allowlist with `rotated:<date>` annotation.

  4C) PII/PHI IN LOGS, ERRORS, OR TELEMETRY
    - Wrap with project's existing redaction utility if present. If not, ADD a minimal in-repo helper (single file, no new dependency) following the masking conventions in Rule 4.
    - Common patterns:
        Express: replace `app.use(morgan('combined'))` with a token that masks Authorization + Cookie headers + body fields by config. Keep route names, status codes, latencies.
        Python logging: add a `logging.Filter` that masks known sensitive keys in `extra` and formatted messages.
        Java SLF4J/Logback: add a `MaskingConverter` and update pattern; OR add a `TurboFilter`. Preserve log levels and existing appenders.
        OpenTelemetry: add a SpanProcessor that strips attributes matching sensitive keys.
    - For HTTP responses leaking stack traces: ensure error handler returns generic message in production; preserve detail in dev/test envs via existing env switch. Do NOT change response status codes or response shape contracts.

  4D) SDE IN FIXTURES / TEST DATA / NOTEBOOKS / RECORDED CASSETTES
    - Replace with synthetic equivalents preserving format and length:
        • Names → Faker-generated (deterministic seed for test stability)
        • Emails → `user{n}@example.com`
        • Phones → 555-01xx (NANP reserved range) or country equivalents
        • SSNs → `000-00-0000` style or documented invalid ranges
        • PANs → BIN ranges reserved for testing (e.g., 4111 1111 1111 1111)
        • IPs → RFC 5737 (192.0.2.0/24, 198.51.100.0/24, 203.0.113.0/24)
        • UUIDs → regenerate with fixed seed for reproducibility
    - For VCR/Polly/nock cassettes: re-record with synthetic auth, OR scrub headers/body via the recording tool's built-in filters. Preserve request/response timing and status to keep tests stable.
    - For Jupyter notebooks: clear outputs of cells containing detected SDEs; preserve code, markdown, and outputs without SDEs.

  4E) SDE FILE TYPES THAT SHOULD NOT BE TRACKED
    - For .env, *.tfstate, *.pem (private), *.pfx, dataSources.xml, recorded HAR with auth, etc.:
        • Untrack via `git rm --cached <file>` (file remains on disk locally; users keep their copies).
        • Add precise pattern to `.gitignore`.
        • If the file contains a live secret, history flag per 4B.

  4F) UNSAFE CONFIG (debug flags, default creds, weak defaults)
    - Flip default to safe value ONLY IF the framework documents the change as backwards compatible AND the default is not relied upon by tests.
    - Otherwise, leave the default and add a comment + entry in PR "Recommended manual changes" section.

  4G) CI WORKFLOWS WITH HARDCODED TOKENS
    - Replace literal with `${{ secrets.NAME }}` reference.
    - Add a comment in the workflow indicating which secret to add in repo settings.
    - Do NOT add the secret yourself.

  After every fix, re-run the relevant scanner on the changed file to confirm the finding is gone and no NEW finding was introduced.

STEP 5 — VERIFY (must all pass before opening PR)
  - Re-run the FULL scan suite. Net new findings introduced = 0. (If > 0, revert that commit and mark deferred.)
  - Run the repository's existing build/test commands as defined by:
      package.json scripts, Makefile/Justfile/Taskfile, tox.ini, noxfile.py, pytest, go test ./..., cargo test, mvn -B verify, ./gradlew check, dotnet test, bundle exec rspec, mix test, composer test
    If a command is undefined, skip it — do NOT invent test commands.
  - For any modified workflow files: validate with `actionlint`.
  - Confirm no public API, env var name, config key, or response shape changed (diff inspection).
  - Confirm `.env.example` exists and is in sync with newly introduced env vars.
  - Confirm `.gitignore` covers all newly untracked sensitive file patterns.
  - Confirm NO secret value, redacted or otherwise, appears in commit messages, PR body, or scan reports beyond the fingerprint format.

STEP 6 — OPEN PULL REQUEST
  Title:
    `chore(security): scheduled sensitive data remediation — <YYYY-MM-DD>`
  Labels (apply if they exist): `security`, `data-protection`, `secrets`, `automated`
  Body must contain ALL sections below, in order:

  ## Summary
  Scheduled automated SDE remediation by Devin. Resolves N findings across M files. No public APIs, env var names, or response contracts changed. Backwards compatible.

  ## Findings Overview
  | Severity | Category | Count Fixed | Count Deferred |
  |---|---|---|---|
  | CRITICAL | Secrets | x | x |
  | CRITICAL | PCI     | x | x |
  | HIGH     | PII     | x | x |
  | HIGH     | PHI     | x | x |
  | MEDIUM   | Unsafe handling | x | x |
  | LOW      | File hygiene    | x | x |

  ## Per-Finding Detail
  Table (one row per fix), with secrets REDACTED:
  | ID | Severity | Category | File:Line | Fingerprint | Verified Live | Remediation | Compliance Tags |
  | F-001 | CRITICAL | AWS Access Key | src/config.js:42 | `AKIA****WXYZ` | yes | replaced with `process.env.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`; rotation issue #N filed | SOC2, GDPR |
  | F-002 | HIGH     | PII in logs    | src/api/users.ts:118 | n/a | n/a | wrapped email in `mask.email()` helper | GDPR, CCPA |

  ## Per-File Diff Explanation
  For EACH modified file, a short bullet describing what changed and why:
  - `src/config.js`: replaced hardcoded AWS key with `process.env.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`; added env var to `.env.example`.
  - `src/api/users.ts`: wrapped `logger.info({ user })` argument with `redact(user, ['email','phone'])` helper added in `src/util/redact.ts`. Existing log structure preserved (same fields, masked values).
  - `.gitignore`: added `*.tfstate`, `*.pem` patterns.
  - `.env.example`: added 3 new placeholder entries.

  ## Backwards Compatibility Analysis
  Explicit statement per change:
  - No env var names were renamed.
  - No public function signatures were changed.
  - No HTTP response shapes were changed.
  - Log line structure preserved; only sensitive field VALUES are now masked.
  - No database schemas, migrations, or production data touched.
  - All masking helpers added are additive (new files / new internal utilities).

  ## Rotation Required (HUMAN ACTION)
  For every secret found (in HEAD or history):
  - [ ] Rotate `<secret name>` in `<provider>` (issue #N)
  - [ ] Confirm propagation to all environments
  - [ ] Update secret in `<secret manager>` / GitHub Actions secrets
  - [ ] Close rotation issue
  Do NOT merge this PR before rotation begins. The exposed credential is considered compromised.

  ## History Exposure
  List of secrets found ONLY in git history (not HEAD):
  | Fingerprint | First seen commit | File at that commit | Rotation issue |
  Recommendation: rotate. History rewrite NOT performed (ALLOW_HISTORY_REWRITE=false).

  ## Verification Performed
  - Scanners run (with versions): <list>
  - Pre-fix counts by severity: C=_ H=_ M=_ L=_
  - Post-fix counts by severity: C=_ H=_ M=_ L=_
  - Build/test commands executed: <list with pass/fail>
  - actionlint status (if applicable): <pass/fail>
  - No new dependencies added: <true/false; if false, list and justify>

  ## Deferred / Not Auto-Fixed
  Table of findings NOT addressed and why (low confidence requiring human judgment, ambiguous test data, would change response contract, etc.), with suggested follow-up.

  ## Recommended Manual Changes
  Items requiring human decision (e.g., flipping a debug flag default, adding a secret to GitHub Actions, rewriting git history).

  ## Rollback
  Single-command rollback: `git revert <merge-sha>`. No data migrations, no infra changes, no rotated credentials are reverted by this rollback (rotation must be tracked separately).

  ## Provenance
  - Devin run ID: <id>
  - Schedule: <cron>
  - Commit range: <base>..<head>
  - Scan reports (redacted): <artifact links>

STEP 7 — POST-PR HYGIENE
  - Open rotation issues for every confirmed-live or high-confidence secret. Title format:
      `[security] Rotate <provider> credential exposed in <repo> — fingerprint <id>`
    Body: redacted fingerprint, file path, commit SHA, suggested rotation steps for that provider, link to PR.
  - Request review from CODEOWNERS for touched paths AND from the security team.
  - Do NOT enable auto-merge. Secret remediation requires human verification.
  - If a previous open PR from this automation exists, close it with a link to the new one.
  - Idempotency: if re-running would produce zero changes, do NOT open a PR. Report "no action needed."

==========================================================
FAILURE & EDGE-CASE HANDLING
==========================================================
- Scanner false positives: defer to human review; document in PR with rationale; suggest allowlist entry.
- Verification API rate limits (TruffleHog live verify): degrade gracefully to pattern-only mode; mark `verified_live: null`.
- Massive history (>10GB): scan HEAD + last 1000 commits; flag as partial scan in PR body; recommend separate deep-history scan.
- Encrypted files (sops, git-crypt, age, BlackBox): SKIP; do not attempt decryption. Note presence in PR body.
- Binary files: skip content scan unless filetype-specific tool exists (e.g., for keystores, check for default passwords).
- Generated/vendored code: skip if path matches common generated patterns (`generated/`, `vendor/`, `node_modules/`, `__generated__/`, `*.pb.go`, `*_pb2.py`); flag any secrets found there as upstream issues.
- Conflicting redactions (a fix for finding A would mask data needed for finding B's audit trail): prefer privacy; document trade-off.
- Network failures: retry with backoff up to 3 times; on persistent failure, abort and report.
- A finding's "fix" would change a response contract or env var name: defer to human, do not auto-apply.

==========================================================
NON-GOALS (do NOT do these)
==========================================================
- Do NOT rotate credentials at the provider.
- Do NOT rewrite git history (unless ALLOW_HISTORY_REWRITE=true).
- Do NOT add new SaaS scanners as repo dependencies.
- Do NOT modify production data, databases, or run migrations.
- Do NOT change application logic, business rules, or feature behavior.
- Do NOT reformat files outside the lines you change.
- Do NOT change package versions or dependency manifests (that's the vulnerability remediation job, not this one).
- Do NOT scan or modify issues, wikis, discussions, or external systems.
- Do NOT auto-fix LOW-confidence findings.
- Do NOT include any unredacted secret value in any output, ever.

==========================================================
OUTPUT
==========================================================
On success: a single PR URL plus a one-paragraph summary of counts (fixed vs deferred) by severity and category, plus a list of rotation issue URLs.
On no-op:   a short message "No remediable sensitive data findings at threshold=<SEVERITY_THRESHOLD>."
On failure: the exact step that failed, redacted command output, and partial artifacts for human review. Do not open a partial PR.

Begin now.