CVE intelligence and bounded remediation
CVE-2026-59249 — Inconsistent interpretation of HTTP requests (HTTP response smuggling) vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a malicious HTTP/1...
Inconsistent interpretation of HTTP requests (HTTP response smuggling) vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a malicious HTTP/1 server to desynchronize a strict intermediary and the Mint client on the same pooled connection, enabling response-queue poisoning against subsequent requests that share the connection. The Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5 function in lib/mint/http1.ex parses the chunk-size line of a Transfer-Encoding: chunked response with Integer.parse(data, 16). RFC 7230 defines chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG and forbids any sign prefix, but Integer.parse/2 accepts an optional leading + or -. A chunk-size line of +5 is accepted as a five-byte chunk; lines of +0 and -0 are accepted as the terminating zero-length chunk and end the message body early. An RFC-strict intermediary in the response path rejects these forms, so the intermediary and the Mint client disagree on where one response ends and the next begins. On a pooled keep-alive connection, an attacker-influenced origin can inject bytes that the client attributes to the next legitimate response on the same connection, poisoning the response queue and corrupting the responses returned to unrelated in-flight requests. This issue…
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS
- 6.3 (4.0)
- Published
- 2026-07-16
- CISA KEV
- Not currently listed
- Ecosystem
- software/application
- Weaknesses
- CWE-444
Affected products
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Matched remediation archetype
HTTP request smuggling and message-boundary ambiguity
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Check exposure
- Inventory every proxy, CDN, gateway, load balancer, service mesh, and application server hop on affected request paths.
- Compare documented parsing and normalization behavior for message length, transfer coding, duplicate headers, and protocol translation.
- Identify connection reuse and which downstream services trust headers added by intermediaries.
Remediate safely
- Update affected intermediaries and origin servers and align them on a single standards-compliant request framing policy.
- Reject ambiguous length, transfer-coding, duplicate, malformed, and unsupported framing before forwarding.
- Normalize or remove hop-by-hop and identity headers at one controlled boundary and add multi-hop regression tests.
Authoritative sources
Complete CVE record and remediation plan
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