CVE intelligence and bounded remediation
CVE-2026-49753 — Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') vulnerability in elixir-mint Mint allows...
Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') vulnerability in elixir-mint Mint allows attacker-controlled HTTP/1 servers to desynchronise response framing on shared connections. Mint's HTTP/1 Content-Length parser, Mint.HTTP1.Parse.content_length_header/1 in lib/mint/http1/parse.ex, parses the header value with Integer.parse/1, which accepts an optional + or - sign prefix. The length >= 0 guard rejects negatives, but inputs such as +0 or +123 are returned as valid lengths. RFC 7230 specifies Content-Length = 1*DIGIT, with no sign character permitted. A fronting proxy or load balancer that strictly enforces the grammar will reject or reframe a header like Content-Length: +0, while Mint silently treats it as zero. When Mint reuses the socket (keep-alive, pipelining, or any pooled connection shared across requesters), the parser disagreement is a response-smuggling primitive: the proxy delimits the body one way, Mint another, and bytes from one response get attributed to the next. Where the same Mint connection is shared across trust boundaries, an attacker-controlled upstream can leak bytes into a different consumer's response stream. This issue a…
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS
- 6.3 (4.0)
- Published
- 2026-06-02
- CISA KEV
- Not currently listed
- Ecosystem
- software/application
- Weaknesses
- CWE-444
Affected products
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Matched remediation archetype
HTTP request smuggling and message-boundary ambiguity
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Check exposure
- Inventory every proxy, CDN, gateway, load balancer, service mesh, and application server hop on affected request paths.
- Compare documented parsing and normalization behavior for message length, transfer coding, duplicate headers, and protocol translation.
- Identify connection reuse and which downstream services trust headers added by intermediaries.
Remediate safely
- Update affected intermediaries and origin servers and align them on a single standards-compliant request framing policy.
- Reject ambiguous length, transfer-coding, duplicate, malformed, and unsupported framing before forwarding.
- Normalize or remove hop-by-hop and identity headers at one controlled boundary and add multi-hop regression tests.
Authoritative sources
Complete CVE record and remediation plan
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