CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2026-45688 — Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform

Critical CVSS 9.1

Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11, Rocket.Chat's CAS login handler forwards the client-supplied options.cas.credentialToken value straight into a MongoDB findOne({_id: ...}) query without any runtime type check. TypeScript's string parameter annotation is erased at runtime, so an unauthenticated attacker can substitute a MongoDB query operator ({"$gt": ""}, {"$ne": null}, etc.) for what the server expects to be an opaque ticket string. The injected operator matches the first unexpired document in the credential_tokens collection, bypassing the CAS ticket check entirely. When any legitimate CAS or SAML SSO login is in flight, the attacker's next DDP login call matches the same credential-token row via the NoSQL operator and is issued a full Meteor auth token (userId + token) bound to the victim. The token is immediately usable against the complete REST and DDP surface as that user. If the victim is an administrator, this escalates to full instance compromise via Apps-Engine app install. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.…

Severity
Critical
CVSS
9.1 (3.1)
Published
2026-06-24
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
software/application
Weaknesses
CWE-943

Affected products

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Matched remediation archetype

SQL and data-query injection

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Check exposure

  • Trace request, message, file, and stored values into SQL, ORM query fragments, filters, sort expressions, and other data-query languages.
  • Inventory database roles, reachable schemas, multi-tenant boundaries, and whether stacked or administrative operations are enabled.
  • Check both direct queries and second-order use of previously stored values.

Remediate safely

  • Use parameterized queries or safe query builders for all values; map identifiers and operators through explicit allowlists.
  • Remove raw query concatenation and give the application account only the tables and operations it requires.
  • Update affected data-access components and add regression tests for query structure preservation with inert edge-case inputs.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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