CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2026-45250 — The setcred(2) system call is only available to privileged users

High CVSS 7.8

The setcred(2) system call is only available to privileged users. However, before the privilege level of the caller is checked, the user-supplied list of supplementary groups is copied into a fixed-size kernel stack buffer without first validating its length. If the supplied list exceeds the capacity of that buffer, a stack buffer overflow occurs. Because the bounds check on the supplementary groups list occurs after the kernel stack buffer has already been written, an unprivileged local user may trigger the overflow without holding any special privilege. Successful exploitation may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of the kernel, allowing an unprivileged local user to gain elevated privileges on the affected system.

Severity
High
CVSS
7.8 (3.1)
Published
2026-05-21
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
operating-system
Weaknesses
CWE-121

Affected products

  • freebsd / freebsd / 14.3

Showing 1 representative product identities from 29 source matches. Confirm exact affected versions with the linked vendor and NVD evidence.

Matched remediation archetype

Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption

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Check exposure

  • Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
  • Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
  • Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
  • Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
  • Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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