CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2026-40253 — openCryptoki is a PKCS#11 library and provides tooling for Linux and AIX

Medium CVSS 6.8

openCryptoki is a PKCS#11 library and provides tooling for Linux and AIX. In versions 3.26.0 and below, the BER/DER decoding functions in the shared common library (asn1.c) accept a raw pointer but no buffer length parameter, and trust attacker-controlled BER length fields without validating them against actual buffer boundaries. All primitive decoders are affected: ber_decode_INTEGER, ber_decode_SEQUENCE, ber_decode_OCTET_STRING, ber_decode_BIT_STRING, and ber_decode_CHOICE. Additionally, ber_decode_INTEGER can produce integer underflows when the encoded length is zero. An attacker supplying a malformed BER-encoded cryptographic object through PKCS#11 operations such as C_CreateObject or C_UnwrapKey, token loading from disk, or remote backend communication can trigger out-of-bounds reads. This affects all token backends (Soft, ICA, CCA, TPM, EP11, ICSF) since the vulnerable code is in the shared common library. A patch is available thorugh commit ed378f463ef73364c89feb0fc923f4dc867332a3.

Severity
Medium
CVSS
6.8 (3.1)
Published
2026-04-16
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
software/application
Weaknesses
CWE-125

Affected products

  • opencryptoki_project / opencryptoki

Matched remediation archetype

Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption

This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.

Check exposure

  • Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
  • Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
  • Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
  • Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
  • Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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