CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2026-3478 — Content Syndication Toolkit security vulnerability

High CVSS 7.2

The Content Syndication Toolkit plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 1.3 via the redux_p AJAX action in the bundled ReduxFramework library. The plugin registers a proxy endpoint (wp_ajax_nopriv_redux_p) that is accessible to unauthenticated users. The proxy() method in the Redux_P class takes a URL directly from $_GET['url'] without any validation (the regex is set to /.*/ which matches all URLs) and passes it to wp_remote_request(), which does not have built-in SSRF protection like wp_safe_remote_request(). There is no authentication check, no nonce verification, and no URL restriction. The response from the requested URL is then returned to the attacker, making this a full-read SSRF. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application, which can be used to query and modify information from internal services, scan internal network ports, or interact with cloud metadata endpoints.

Severity
High
CVSS
7.2 (3.1)
Published
2026-03-21
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
php/wordpress
Weaknesses
CWE-918

Affected products

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Matched remediation archetype

Server-side request forgery and unintended proxying

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Check exposure

  • Inventory server-side URL fetchers, webhooks, importers, previews, redirects, proxies, and protocol handlers reachable from untrusted input.
  • Map egress paths to internal services, metadata endpoints, loopback, private address space, and privileged control planes.
  • Review DNS resolution, redirect, proxy, credential-forwarding, and URL parsing behavior without requesting sensitive targets.

Remediate safely

  • Replace arbitrary destinations with named integrations or a strict allowlist of schemes, hosts, ports, and paths.
  • Resolve and validate every destination and redirect hop, then enforce egress policy independently of application checks.
  • Remove ambient credentials and sensitive headers from fetchers; apply response size, time, and content limits.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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