CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2026-33726 — Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane

Medium CVSS 5.4

Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. Prior to versions 1.17.14, 1.18.8, and 1.19.2, Ingress Network Policies are not enforced for traffic from pods to L7 Services (Envoy, GAMMA) with a local backend on the same node, when Per-Endpoint Routing is enabled and BPF Host Routing is disabled. Per-Endpoint Routing is disabled by default, but is automatically enabled in deployments using cloud IPAM, including Cilium ENI on EKS (`eni.enabled`), AlibabaCloud ENI (`alibabacloud.enabled`), Azure IPAM (`azure.enabled`, but not AKS BYOCNI), and some GKE deployments (`gke.enabled`; managed offerings such as GKE Dataplane V2 may use different defaults). It is typically not enabled in tunneled deployments, and chaining deployments are not affected. In practice, Amazon EKS with Cilium ENI mode is likely the most common affected environment. Versions 1.17.14, 1.18.8, and 1.19.2 contain a patch. There is currently no officially verified or comprehensive workaround for this issue. The only option would be to disable per-endpoint routes, but this will likely cause disruptions to ongoing connections, and potential conflicts if running in cloud provid…

Severity
Medium
CVSS
5.4 (3.1)
Published
2026-03-27
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
software/application
Weaknesses
CWE-284, CWE-863

Affected products

  • cilium / cilium

Showing 1 representative product identities from 3 source matches. Confirm exact affected versions with the linked vendor and NVD evidence.

Matched remediation archetype

Authorization bypass, IDOR, and cross-tenant access

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Check exposure

  • Map object and action authorization checks across API, UI, batch, import/export, and background-job paths.
  • Identify tenant, ownership, role, and policy boundaries for affected resources and administrative operations.
  • Use synthetic fixtures to compare intended access matrices without accessing another user's real data.

Remediate safely

  • Enforce server-side authorization at each resource access and state transition using the authenticated principal and trusted tenant context.
  • Scope data queries by tenant and ownership; treat client-supplied identifiers, roles, and policy claims as untrusted.
  • Add deny-by-default policy tests for horizontal and vertical access across every affected transport.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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