CVE intelligence and bounded remediation
CVE-2026-13430 — Post Export Import with Media security vulnerability
The Post Export Import with Media plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Upload in all versions up to, and including, 1.13.1 via the import_media_file_secure function. This is due to insufficient file extension validation caused by a trailing-dot filename bypass, where the extension allow-list check in ajax_import_media_start() uses pathinfo() on the raw ZIP entry name (e.g., 'shell.php.'), which returns an empty string for the extension, causing the allow-list guard to be skipped and the file to be extracted to a temporary location, after which import_media_file_secure() copies it into the WordPress uploads directory without re-validating the extension. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access and above, to upload files that may be executable, which makes remote code execution possible.
- Severity
- High
- CVSS
- 7.2 (3.1)
- Published
- 2026-07-10
- CISA KEV
- Not currently listed
- Ecosystem
- php/wordpress
- Weaknesses
- CWE-434
Affected products
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Matched remediation archetype
Path traversal, unsafe upload, and file handling
This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.
Check exposure
- Trace untrusted filenames, archive entries, URLs, and path segments into read, write, include, extraction, and upload operations.
- Identify filesystem roots, mount permissions, symbolic-link behavior, archive handling, and whether uploaded content is web-accessible or executable.
- Review canonicalization and containment checks across supported operating systems and storage backends.
Remediate safely
- Generate server-side storage identifiers and resolve paths beneath a fixed root using filesystem-aware containment checks.
- Reject absolute, parent-relative, alternate-separator, device, link, and archive entries that escape the intended root.
- Store uploads outside executable or served paths, validate type and size, and use private atomic temporary files.
Authoritative sources
Complete CVE record and remediation plan
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