CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2025-8065 — A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability was identified in the ONVIF SOAP XML Parser in Tapo C200 v3 and C520WS v2.6

High CVSS 8.7

A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability was identified in the ONVIF SOAP XML Parser in Tapo C200 v3 and C520WS v2.6. When processing XML tags with namespace prefixes, the parser fails to validate the prefix length before copying it to a fixed-size stack buffer. It allowed a crafted SOAP request with an oversized namespace prefix to cause memory corruption in stack. An unauthenticated attacker on the same local network may exploit this flaw to enable remote code execution with elevated privileges, leading to full compromise of the device.

Severity
High
CVSS
8.7 (4.0)
Published
2025-12-20
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
operating-system
Weaknesses
CWE-121, CWE-120

Affected products

  • tp-link / tapo_c200_firmware / 1.3.3
  • tp-link / tapo_c200_firmware / 1.3.4
  • tp-link / tapo_c200_firmware / 1.3.5
  • tp-link / tapo_c200_firmware / 1.3.7
  • tp-link / tapo_c200_firmware / 1.3.9
  • tp-link / tapo_c200_firmware / 1.3.11

Showing 6 representative product identities from 12 source matches. Confirm exact affected versions with the linked vendor and NVD evidence.

Matched remediation archetype

Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption

This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.

Check exposure

  • Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
  • Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
  • Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
  • Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
  • Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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