CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2025-61916 — Spinnaker is an open source, multi-cloud continuous delivery platform

High CVSS 7.9

Spinnaker is an open source, multi-cloud continuous delivery platform. Versions prior to 2025.1.6, 2025.2.3, and 2025.3.0 are vulnerable to server-side request forgery. The primary impact is allowing users to fetch data from a remote URL. This data can be then injected into spinnaker pipelines via helm or other methods to extract things LIKE idmsv1 authentication data. This also includes calling internal spinnaker API's via a get and similar endpoints. Further, depending upon the artifact in question, auth data may be exposed to arbitrary endpoints (e.g. GitHub auth headers) leading to credentials exposure. To trigger this, a spinnaker installation MUST have two things. The first is an artifact enabled that allows user input. This includes GitHub file artifacts, BitBucket, GitLab, HTTP artifacts and similar artifact providers. JUST enabling the http artifact provider will add a "no-auth" http provider that could be used to extract link local data (e.g. AWS Metadata information). The second is a system that can consume the output of these artifacts. e.g. Rosco helm can use this to fetch values data. K8s account manifests if the API returns JSON can be used to inject that data into…

Severity
High
CVSS
7.9 (3.1)
Published
2026-01-05
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
software/application
Weaknesses
CWE-20, CWE-523, CWE-918

Affected products

  • linuxfoundation / spinnaker

Showing 1 representative product identities from 2 source matches. Confirm exact affected versions with the linked vendor and NVD evidence.

Matched remediation archetype

Server-side request forgery and unintended proxying

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Check exposure

  • Inventory server-side URL fetchers, webhooks, importers, previews, redirects, proxies, and protocol handlers reachable from untrusted input.
  • Map egress paths to internal services, metadata endpoints, loopback, private address space, and privileged control planes.
  • Review DNS resolution, redirect, proxy, credential-forwarding, and URL parsing behavior without requesting sensitive targets.

Remediate safely

  • Replace arbitrary destinations with named integrations or a strict allowlist of schemes, hosts, ports, and paths.
  • Resolve and validate every destination and redirect hop, then enforce egress policy independently of application checks.
  • Remove ambient credentials and sensitive headers from fetchers; apply response size, time, and content limits.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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