CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2025-37945 — Linux Linux Kernel security vulnerability

Medium CVSS 5.5

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: phy: allow MDIO bus PM ops to start/stop state machine for phylink-controlled PHY DSA has 2 kinds of drivers: 1. Those who call dsa_switch_suspend() and dsa_switch_resume() from their device PM ops: qca8k-8xxx, bcm_sf2, microchip ksz 2. Those who don't: all others. The above methods should be optional. For type 1, dsa_switch_suspend() calls dsa_user_suspend() -> phylink_stop(), and dsa_switch_resume() calls dsa_user_resume() -> phylink_start(). These seem good candidates for setting mac_managed_pm = true because that is essentially its definition [1], but that does not seem to be the biggest problem for now, and is not what this change focuses on. Talking strictly about the 2nd category of DSA drivers here (which do not have MAC managed PM, meaning that for their attached PHYs, mdio_bus_phy_suspend() and mdio_bus_phy_resume() should run in full), I have noticed that the following warning from mdio_bus_phy_resume() is triggered: WARN_ON(phydev->state != PHY_HALTED && phydev->state != PHY_READY && phydev->state != PHY_UP); because the PHY state machine is running. It's running as a result of a previous dsa_user…

Severity
Medium
CVSS
5.5 (3.1)
Published
2025-05-20
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
linux/kernel
Weaknesses
CWE-476

Affected products

  • linux / linux_kernel
  • linux / linux_kernel / 6.15

Showing 2 representative product identities from 5 source matches. Confirm exact affected versions with the linked vendor and NVD evidence.

Matched remediation archetype

Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption

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Check exposure

  • Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
  • Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
  • Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
  • Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
  • Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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