CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2025-21857 — Linux Linux Kernel security vulnerability

Medium CVSS 5.5

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_api: fix error handling causing NULL dereference tcf_exts_miss_cookie_base_alloc() calls xa_alloc_cyclic() which can return 1 if the allocation succeeded after wrapping. This was treated as an error, with value 1 returned to caller tcf_exts_init_ex() which sets exts->actions to NULL and returns 1 to caller fl_change(). fl_change() treats err == 1 as success, calling tcf_exts_validate_ex() which calls tcf_action_init() with exts->actions as argument, where it is dereferenced. Example trace: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 CPU: 114 PID: 16151 Comm: handler114 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-503.16.1.el9_5.x86_64 #1 RIP: 0010:tcf_action_init+0x1f8/0x2c0 Call Trace: tcf_action_init+0x1f8/0x2c0 tcf_exts_validate_ex+0x175/0x190 fl_change+0x537/0x1120 [cls_flower]

Severity
Medium
CVSS
5.5 (3.1)
Published
2025-03-12
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
linux/kernel
Weaknesses
CWE-476

Affected products

  • linux / linux_kernel
  • linux / linux_kernel / 6.14

Showing 2 representative product identities from 6 source matches. Confirm exact affected versions with the linked vendor and NVD evidence.

Matched remediation archetype

Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption

This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.

Check exposure

  • Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
  • Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
  • Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
  • Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
  • Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

The detailed catalog view below loads this exact record, its source evidence, and the full seven-phase agentic change plan.