CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2025-15576 — Freebsd Freebsd security vulnerability

High CVSS 7.5

If two sibling jails are restricted to separate filesystem trees, which is to say that neither of the two jail root directories is an ancestor of the other, jailed processes may nonetheless be able to access a shared directory via a nullfs mount, if the administrator has configured one. In this case, cooperating processes in the two jails may establish a connection using a unix domain socket and exchange directory descriptors with each other. When performing a filesystem name lookup, at each step of the lookup, the kernel checks whether the lookup would descend below the jail root of the current process. If the jail root directory is not encountered, the lookup continues. In a configuration where processes in two different jails are able to exchange file descriptors using a unix domain socket, it is possible for a jailed process to receive a directory for a descriptor that is below that process' jail root. This enables full filesystem access for a jailed process, breaking the chroot. Note that the system administrator is still responsible for ensuring that an unprivileged user on the jail host is not able to pass directory descriptors to a jailed process, even in a patched kernel.

Severity
High
CVSS
7.5 (3.1)
Published
2026-03-09
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
operating-system
Weaknesses
CWE-269, CWE-488, CWE-790

Affected products

  • freebsd / freebsd / 13.5
  • freebsd / freebsd / 14.3

Showing 2 representative product identities from 19 source matches. Confirm exact affected versions with the linked vendor and NVD evidence.

Matched remediation archetype

Privilege escalation and unsafe privilege management

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Check exposure

  • Map service accounts, operating-system identities, roles, capabilities, impersonation, set-user transitions, and administrative helper paths.
  • Determine whether untrusted users or lower-privilege processes can reach the affected transition or modify inputs it trusts.
  • Review file, socket, registry, device, job, container, and cloud-role permissions used before and after privilege changes.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the supported fix and redesign privileged operations as a minimal, authenticated, allowlisted interface.
  • Drop privileges before processing untrusted input, verify the drop succeeds, and remove unnecessary roles, capabilities, and write permissions.
  • Validate ownership and permissions at time of use and add explicit lower-to-higher privilege boundary tests.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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