CVE intelligence and bounded remediation
CVE-2025-12058 — Keras.Model.load_model method, including when executed with the intende… security vulnerability
The Keras.Model.load_model method, including when executed with the intended security mitigation safe_mode=True, is vulnerable to arbitrary local file loading and Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This vulnerability stems from the way the StringLookup layer is handled during model loading from a specially crafted .keras archive. The constructor for the StringLookup layer accepts a vocabulary argument that can specify a local file path or a remote file path. * Arbitrary Local File Read: An attacker can create a malicious .keras file that embeds a local path in the StringLookup layer's configuration. When the model is loaded, Keras will attempt to read the content of the specified local file and incorporate it into the model state (e.g., retrievable via get_vocabulary()), allowing an attacker to read arbitrary local files on the hosting system. * Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): Keras utilizes tf.io.gfile for file operations. Since tf.io.gfile supports remote filesystem handlers (such as GCS and HDFS) and HTTP/HTTPS protocols, the same mechanism can be leveraged to fetch content from arbitrary network endpoints on the server's behalf, resulting in an SSRF condition. The securit…
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS
- 5.9 (4.0)
- Published
- 2025-10-29
- CISA KEV
- Not currently listed
- Ecosystem
- software/application
- Weaknesses
- CWE-502
Affected products
No browser-safe affected-product rows are available.
Matched remediation archetype
Unsafe deserialization and object reconstruction
This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.
Check exposure
- Inventory serialization formats accepted from requests, queues, caches, files, cookies, and cross-service messages.
- Trace whether untrusted input can select classes, types, callbacks, constructors, or object hooks during decoding.
- Identify signing, schema validation, trust-boundary, and compatibility settings for each decoder.
Remediate safely
- Replace native object deserialization with a data-only format and explicit schema validation.
- If replacement is not immediate, use a safe decoder with a minimal type allowlist and disable polymorphic or executable hooks.
- Update the affected library and add inert tests for unknown types, extra fields, malformed nesting, and unsigned data.
Authoritative sources
Complete CVE record and remediation plan
The detailed catalog view below loads this exact record, its source evidence, and the full seven-phase agentic change plan.