CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2024-58009 — Linux Linux Kernel security vulnerability

Medium CVSS 5.5

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: handle NULL sock pointer in l2cap_sock_alloc A NULL sock pointer is passed into l2cap_sock_alloc() when it is called from l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() and the error handling paths should also be aware of it. Seemingly a more elegant solution would be to swap bt_sock_alloc() and l2cap_chan_create() calls since they are not interdependent to that moment but then l2cap_chan_create() adds the soon to be deallocated and still dummy-initialized channel to the global list accessible by many L2CAP paths. The channel would be removed from the list in short period of time but be a bit more straight-forward here and just check for NULL instead of changing the order of function calls. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE static analysis tool.

Severity
Medium
CVSS
5.5 (3.1)
Published
2025-02-27
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
linux/kernel
Weaknesses
CWE-476

Affected products

  • linux / linux_kernel

Showing 1 representative product identities from 7 source matches. Confirm exact affected versions with the linked vendor and NVD evidence.

Matched remediation archetype

Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption

This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.

Check exposure

  • Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
  • Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
  • Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
  • Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
  • Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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