CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2024-45020 — Linux Linux Kernel security vulnerability

Medium CVSS 5.5

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix a kernel verifier crash in stacksafe() Daniel Hodges reported a kernel verifier crash when playing with sched-ext. Further investigation shows that the crash is due to invalid memory access in stacksafe(). More specifically, it is the following code: if (exact != NOT_EXACT && old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] != cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE]) return false; The 'i' iterates old->allocated_stack. If cur->allocated_stack < old->allocated_stack the out-of-bound access will happen. To fix the issue add 'i >= cur->allocated_stack' check such that if the condition is true, stacksafe() should fail. Otherwise, cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] memory access is legal.

Severity
Medium
CVSS
5.5 (3.1)
Published
2024-09-11
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
linux/kernel
Weaknesses
CWE-787

Affected products

  • linux / linux_kernel
  • linux / linux_kernel / 6.11

Showing 2 representative product identities from 5 source matches. Confirm exact affected versions with the linked vendor and NVD evidence.

Matched remediation archetype

Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption

This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.

Check exposure

  • Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
  • Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
  • Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
  • Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
  • Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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