CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2024-41014 — Linux Linux Kernel security vulnerability

High CVSS 7.1

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: add bounds checking to xlog_recover_process_data There is a lack of verification of the space occupied by fixed members of xlog_op_header in the xlog_recover_process_data. We can create a crafted image to trigger an out of bounds read by following these steps: 1) Mount an image of xfs, and do some file operations to leave records 2) Before umounting, copy the image for subsequent steps to simulate abnormal exit. Because umount will ensure that tail_blk and head_blk are the same, which will result in the inability to enter xlog_recover_process_data 3) Write a tool to parse and modify the copied image in step 2 4) Make the end of the xlog_op_header entries only 1 byte away from xlog_rec_header->h_size 5) xlog_rec_header->h_num_logops++ 6) Modify xlog_rec_header->h_crc Fix: Add a check to make sure there is sufficient space to access fixed members of xlog_op_header.

Severity
High
CVSS
7.1 (3.1)
Published
2024-07-29
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
linux/kernel
Weaknesses
CWE-125

Affected products

  • linux / linux_kernel

Showing 1 representative product identities from 3 source matches. Confirm exact affected versions with the linked vendor and NVD evidence.

Matched remediation archetype

Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption

This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.

Check exposure

  • Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
  • Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
  • Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
  • Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
  • Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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