CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2024-20499 — Cisco Meraki Z4C Firmware security vulnerability

High CVSS 8.6

Multiple vulnerabilities in the Cisco AnyConnect VPN server of Cisco Meraki MX and Cisco Meraki Z Series Teleworker Gateway devices could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a DoS condition in the AnyConnect service on an affected device. These vulnerabilities are due to insufficient validation of client-supplied parameters while establishing an SSL VPN session. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by sending a crafted HTTPS request to the VPN server of an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the Cisco AnyConnect VPN server to restart, resulting in the failure of the established SSL VPN connections and forcing remote users to initiate a new VPN connection and reauthenticate. A sustained attack could prevent new SSL VPN connections from being established. Note: When the attack traffic stops, the Cisco AnyConnect VPN server recovers gracefully without requiring manual intervention.

Severity
High
CVSS
8.6 (3.1)
Published
2024-10-02
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
operating-system
Weaknesses
CWE-787

Affected products

  • cisco / meraki_z4c_firmware
  • cisco / meraki_z4_firmware
  • cisco / meraki_z3c_firmware
  • cisco / meraki_z3_firmware
  • cisco / meraki_vmx_firmware
  • cisco / meraki_mx600_firmware

Showing 6 representative product identities from 25 source matches. Confirm exact affected versions with the linked vendor and NVD evidence.

Matched remediation archetype

Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption

This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.

Check exposure

  • Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
  • Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
  • Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
  • Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
  • Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

The detailed catalog view below loads this exact record, its source evidence, and the full seven-phase agentic change plan.