CVE intelligence and bounded remediation
CVE-2024-20330 — Cisco Firepower Threat Defense security vulnerability
A vulnerability in the Snort 2 and Snort 3 TCP and UDP detection engine of Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software for Cisco Firepower 2100 Series Appliances could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause memory corruption, which could cause the Snort detection engine to restart unexpectedly. This vulnerability is due to improper memory management when the Snort detection engine processes specific TCP or UDP packets. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted TCP or UDP packets through a device that is inspecting traffic using the Snort detection engine. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to restart the Snort detection engine repeatedly, which could cause a denial of service (DoS) condition. The DoS condition impacts only the traffic through the device that is examined by the Snort detection engine. The device can still be managed over the network. Note: Once a memory block is corrupted, it cannot be cleared until the Cisco Firepower 2100 Series Appliance is manually reloaded. This means that the Snort detection engine could crash repeatedly, causing traffic that is processed by the Snort detection engine to be dropped until the devi…
- Severity
- High
- CVSS
- 8.6 (3.1)
- Published
- 2024-10-23
- CISA KEV
- Not currently listed
- Ecosystem
- software/application
- Weaknesses
- CWE-788
Affected products
- cisco / firepower_threat_defense / 7.0.0.0
- cisco / firepower_threat_defense / 7.0.0.1
- cisco / firepower_threat_defense / 7.0.1
- cisco / firepower_threat_defense / 7.0.1.1
- cisco / firepower_threat_defense / 7.0.2
- cisco / firepower_threat_defense / 7.0.2.1
Matched remediation archetype
Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption
This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.
Check exposure
- Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
- Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
- Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.
Remediate safely
- Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
- Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
- Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.
Authoritative sources
Complete CVE record and remediation plan
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