CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2023-42669 — A vulnerability was found in Samba's "rpcecho" development server, a non-Windows RPC server used to test Samba's DCE/RPC stack elements

Medium CVSS 6.5

A vulnerability was found in Samba's "rpcecho" development server, a non-Windows RPC server used to test Samba's DCE/RPC stack elements. This vulnerability stems from an RPC function that can be blocked indefinitely. The issue arises because the "rpcecho" service operates with only one worker in the main RPC task, allowing calls to the "rpcecho" server to be blocked for a specified time, causing service disruptions. This disruption is triggered by a "sleep()" call in the "dcesrv_echo_TestSleep()" function under specific conditions. Authenticated users or attackers can exploit this vulnerability to make calls to the "rpcecho" server, requesting it to block for a specified duration, effectively disrupting most services and leading to a complete denial of service on the AD DC. The DoS affects all other services as "rpcecho" runs in the main RPC task.

Severity
Medium
CVSS
6.5 (3.1)
Published
2023-11-06
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
windows/system
Weaknesses
CWE-400

Affected products

  • samba / samba
  • redhat / storage / 3.0
  • redhat / enterprise_linux / 8.0
  • redhat / enterprise_linux / 9.0
  • redhat / enterprise_linux_eus / 9.0
  • redhat / enterprise_linux_for_ibm_z_systems / 9.0_s390x

Showing 6 representative product identities from 11 source matches. Confirm exact affected versions with the linked vendor and NVD evidence.

Matched remediation archetype

Resource exhaustion and denial of service

This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.

Check exposure

  • Identify attacker-influenced work factors including input size, nesting, compression, fan-out, regex cost, allocation, recursion, retries, and connection lifetime.
  • Map per-request and shared CPU, memory, disk, descriptor, thread, queue, and downstream-service limits.
  • Determine whether authentication, tenancy, quotas, and rate controls apply before expensive processing begins.

Remediate safely

  • Bound input size, nesting, expansion, work, concurrency, queue depth, retries, and execution time before resource-intensive processing.
  • Release resources on every success, error, cancellation, and timeout path and use backpressure instead of unbounded buffering.
  • Update affected components and add small deterministic tests that assert resource ceilings rather than exhausting a host.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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