CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2023-26487 — Vega-Functions Project Vega-Functions security vulnerability

Medium CVSS 6.5

Vega is a visualization grammar, a declarative format for creating, saving, and sharing interactive visualization designs.`lassoAppend' function accepts 3 arguments and internally invokes `push` function on the 1st argument specifying array consisting of 2nd and 3rd arguments as `push` call argument. The type of the 1st argument is supposed to be an array, but it's not enforced. This makes it possible to specify any object with a `push` function as the 1st argument, `push` function can be set to any function that can be access via `event.view` (no all such functions can be exploited due to invalid context or signature, but some can, e.g. `console.log`). The issue is that`lassoAppend` doesn't enforce proper types of its arguments. This issue opens various XSS vectors, but exact impact and severity depends on the environment (e.g. Core JS `setImmediate` polyfill basically allows `eval`-like functionality). This issue was patched in 5.23.0.

Severity
Medium
CVSS
6.5 (3.1)
Published
2023-03-04
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
software/application
Weaknesses
CWE-79

Affected products

  • vega-functions_project / vega-functions
  • vega_project / vega

Matched remediation archetype

Cross-site scripting and unsafe browser output

This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.

Check exposure

  • Trace reflected, stored, and DOM-derived untrusted values into HTML, attributes, URLs, styles, scripts, and client-side template sinks.
  • Identify affected origins, authenticated user roles, sensitive browser capabilities, and where content is shared across tenants.
  • Review framework escaping, rich-text sanitization, legacy templates, and client-side rendering paths.

Remediate safely

  • Use context-aware framework output encoding and safe DOM APIs; keep untrusted data out of executable contexts.
  • Sanitize intentionally supported markup with a maintained allowlist policy and validate URLs and attributes separately.
  • Update affected rendering components and add tests for every output context using inert sentinel markup.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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