CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2022-49605 — Linux Linux Kernel security vulnerability

Medium CVSS 5.5

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: igc: Reinstate IGC_REMOVED logic and implement it properly The initially merged version of the igc driver code (via commit 146740f9abc4, "igc: Add support for PF") contained the following IGC_REMOVED checks in the igc_rd32/wr32() MMIO accessors: u32 igc_rd32(struct igc_hw *hw, u32 reg) { u8 __iomem *hw_addr = READ_ONCE(hw->hw_addr); u32 value = 0; if (IGC_REMOVED(hw_addr)) return ~value; value = readl(&hw_addr[reg]); /* reads should not return all F's */ if (!(~value) && (!reg || !(~readl(hw_addr)))) hw->hw_addr = NULL; return value; } And: #define wr32(reg, val) \ do { \ u8 __iomem *hw_addr = READ_ONCE((hw)->hw_addr); \ if (!IGC_REMOVED(hw_addr)) \ writel((val), &hw_addr[(reg)]); \ } while (0) E.g. igb has similar checks in its MMIO accessors, and has a similar macro E1000_REMOVED, which is implemented as follows: #define E1000_REMOVED(h) unlikely(!(h)) These checks serve to detect and take note of an 0xffffffff MMIO read return from the device, which can be caused by a PCIe link flap or some other kind of PCI bus error, and to avoid performing MMIO reads and writes from that point onwards. However, the IGC_REMOV…

Severity
Medium
CVSS
5.5 (3.1)
Published
2025-02-26
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
linux/kernel
Weaknesses
CWE-476

Affected products

  • linux / linux_kernel
  • linux / linux_kernel / 5.19

Showing 2 representative product identities from 11 source matches. Confirm exact affected versions with the linked vendor and NVD evidence.

Matched remediation archetype

Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption

This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.

Check exposure

  • Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
  • Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
  • Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
  • Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
  • Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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