CVE intelligence and bounded remediation
CVE-2022-48647 — Linux Linux Kernel security vulnerability
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sfc: fix TX channel offset when using legacy interrupts In legacy interrupt mode the tx_channel_offset was hardcoded to 1, but that's not correct if efx_sepparate_tx_channels is false. In that case, the offset is 0 because the tx queues are in the single existing channel at index 0, together with the rx queue. Without this fix, as soon as you try to send any traffic, it tries to get the tx queues from an uninitialized channel getting these errors: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/tx.c:540 efx_hard_start_xmit+0x12e/0x170 [sfc] [...] RIP: 0010:efx_hard_start_xmit+0x12e/0x170 [sfc] [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> dev_hard_start_xmit+0xd7/0x230 sch_direct_xmit+0x9f/0x360 __dev_queue_xmit+0x890/0xa40 [...] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020 [...] RIP: 0010:efx_hard_start_xmit+0x153/0x170 [sfc] [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> dev_hard_start_xmit+0xd7/0x230 sch_direct_xmit+0x9f/0x360 __dev_queue_xmit+0x890/0xa40 [...]
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS
- 5.5 (3.1)
- Published
- 2024-04-28
- CISA KEV
- Not currently listed
- Ecosystem
- linux/kernel
- Weaknesses
- CWE-476
Affected products
- linux / linux_kernel
- linux / linux_kernel / 6.0
Matched remediation archetype
Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption
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Check exposure
- Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
- Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
- Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.
Remediate safely
- Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
- Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
- Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.
Authoritative sources
Complete CVE record and remediation plan
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