CVE intelligence and bounded remediation
CVE-2022-28806 — Fujitsu Lifebook A3510 Firmware security vulnerability
An issue was discovered on certain Fujitsu LIEFBOOK devices (A3510, U9310, U7511/U7411/U7311, U9311, E5510/E5410, U7510/U7410/U7310, E459/E449) with BIOS versions before v1.09 (A3510), v2.17 (U9310), v2.30 (U7511/U7411/U7311), v2.33 (U9311), v2.23 (E5510), v2.19 (U7510/U7410), v2.13 (U7310), and v1.09 (E459/E449). The FjGabiFlashCoreAbstractionSmm driver registers a Software System Management Interrupt (SWSMI) handler that is not sufficiently validated to ensure that the CommBuffer (or any other communication buffer's nested contents) are not pointing to SMRAM contents. A potential attacker can therefore write fixed data to SMRAM, which could lead to data corruption inside this memory (e.g., change the SMI handler's code or modify SMRAM map structures to break input pointer validation for other SMI handlers). Thus, the attacker could elevate privileges from ring 0 to ring -2 and execute arbitrary code in SMM.
- Severity
- High
- CVSS
- 7.8 (3.1)
- Published
- 2022-05-04
- CISA KEV
- Not currently listed
- Ecosystem
- operating-system
- Weaknesses
- CWE-787
Affected products
- fujitsu / lifebook_a3510_firmware
- fujitsu / lifebook_u9310_firmware
- fujitsu / lifebook_u7511_firmware
- fujitsu / lifebook_u7411_firmware
- fujitsu / lifebook_u7311_firmware
- fujitsu / lifebook_u9311_firmware
Matched remediation archetype
Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption
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Check exposure
- Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
- Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
- Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.
Remediate safely
- Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
- Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
- Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.
Authoritative sources
Complete CVE record and remediation plan
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