CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2021-32777 — Envoy is an open source L7 proxy and communication bus designed for large modern service oriented architectures

High CVSS 8.6

Envoy is an open source L7 proxy and communication bus designed for large modern service oriented architectures. In affected versions when ext-authz extension is sending request headers to the external authorization service it must merge multiple value headers according to the HTTP spec. However, only the last header value is sent. This may allow specifically crafted requests to bypass authorization. Attackers may be able to escalate privileges when using ext-authz extension or back end service that uses multiple value headers for authorization. A specifically constructed request may be delivered by an untrusted downstream peer in the presence of ext-authz extension. Envoy versions 1.19.1, 1.18.4, 1.17.4, 1.16.5 contain fixes to the ext-authz extension to correctly merge multiple request header values, when sending request for authorization.

Severity
High
CVSS
8.6 (3.1)
Published
2021-08-24
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
software/application
Weaknesses
CWE-551, CWE-863

Affected products

  • envoyproxy / envoy
  • envoyproxy / envoy / 1.19.0

Showing 2 representative product identities from 4 source matches. Confirm exact affected versions with the linked vendor and NVD evidence.

Matched remediation archetype

Authorization bypass, IDOR, and cross-tenant access

This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.

Check exposure

  • Map object and action authorization checks across API, UI, batch, import/export, and background-job paths.
  • Identify tenant, ownership, role, and policy boundaries for affected resources and administrative operations.
  • Use synthetic fixtures to compare intended access matrices without accessing another user's real data.

Remediate safely

  • Enforce server-side authorization at each resource access and state transition using the authenticated principal and trusted tenant context.
  • Scope data queries by tenant and ownership; treat client-supplied identifiers, roles, and policy claims as untrusted.
  • Add deny-by-default policy tests for horizontal and vertical access across every affected transport.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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