CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2021-22696 — Apache Cxf security vulnerability

High CVSS 7.5

CXF supports (via JwtRequestCodeFilter) passing OAuth 2 parameters via a JWT token as opposed to query parameters (see: The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR)). Instead of sending a JWT token as a "request" parameter, the spec also supports specifying a URI from which to retrieve a JWT token from via the "request_uri" parameter. CXF was not validating the "request_uri" parameter (apart from ensuring it uses "https) and was making a REST request to the parameter in the request to retrieve a token. This means that CXF was vulnerable to DDos attacks on the authorization server, as specified in section 10.4.1 of the spec. This issue affects Apache CXF versions prior to 3.4.3; Apache CXF versions prior to 3.3.10.

Severity
High
CVSS
7.5 (3.1)
Published
2021-04-02
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
software/application
Weaknesses
CWE-400, CWE-918

Affected products

  • apache / cxf
  • oracle / business_intelligence / 5.5.0.0.0
  • oracle / business_intelligence / 5.9.0.0.0
  • oracle / business_intelligence / 12.2.1.3.0
  • oracle / business_intelligence / 12.2.1.4.0
  • oracle / communications_diameter_intelligence_hub

Showing 6 representative product identities from 11 source matches. Confirm exact affected versions with the linked vendor and NVD evidence.

Matched remediation archetype

Server-side request forgery and unintended proxying

This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.

Check exposure

  • Inventory server-side URL fetchers, webhooks, importers, previews, redirects, proxies, and protocol handlers reachable from untrusted input.
  • Map egress paths to internal services, metadata endpoints, loopback, private address space, and privileged control planes.
  • Review DNS resolution, redirect, proxy, credential-forwarding, and URL parsing behavior without requesting sensitive targets.

Remediate safely

  • Replace arbitrary destinations with named integrations or a strict allowlist of schemes, hosts, ports, and paths.
  • Resolve and validate every destination and redirect hop, then enforce egress policy independently of application checks.
  • Remove ambient credentials and sensitive headers from fetchers; apply response size, time, and content limits.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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