CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2021-21257 — Contiki-NG is an open-source, cross-platform operating system for internet of things devices

High CVSS 8.2

Contiki-NG is an open-source, cross-platform operating system for internet of things devices. The RPL-Classic and RPL-Lite implementations in the Contiki-NG operating system versions prior to 4.6 do not validate the address pointer in the RPL source routing header This makes it possible for an attacker to cause out-of-bounds writes with packets injected into the network stack. Specifically, the problem lies in the rpl_ext_header_srh_update function in the two rpl-ext-header.c modules for RPL-Classic and RPL-Lite respectively. The addr_ptr variable is calculated using an unvalidated CMPR field value from the source routing header. An out-of-bounds write can be triggered on line 151 in os/net/routing/rpl-lite/rpl-ext-header.c and line 261 in os/net/routing/rpl-classic/rpl-ext-header.c, which contain the following memcpy call with addr_ptr as destination. The problem has been patched in Contiki-NG 4.6. Users can apply a patch out-of-band as a workaround.

Severity
High
CVSS
8.2 (3.1)
Published
2021-06-18
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
operating-system
Weaknesses
CWE-787

Affected products

  • contiki-ng / contiki-ng

Matched remediation archetype

Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption

This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.

Check exposure

  • Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
  • Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
  • Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
  • Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
  • Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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