CVE intelligence and bounded remediation
CVE-2021-1466 — Cisco Catalyst Sd-Wan Manager security vulnerability
A vulnerability in the vDaemon service of Cisco SD-WAN vManage Software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to cause a buffer overflow on an affected system, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. The vulnerability is due to incomplete bounds checks for data that is provided to the vDaemon service of an affected system. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending malicious data to the vDaemon listening service on the affected system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a buffer overflow condition on the affected system, which could allow the attacker to cause the vDaemon listening service to reload and result in a DoS condition.Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability.
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS
- 5.4 (3.1)
- Published
- 2024-11-15
- CISA KEV
- Not currently listed
- Ecosystem
- software/application
- Weaknesses
- CWE-20
Affected products
- cisco / catalyst_sd-wan_manager / 17.2.4
- cisco / catalyst_sd-wan_manager / 17.2.5
- cisco / catalyst_sd-wan_manager / 17.2.6
- cisco / catalyst_sd-wan_manager / 17.2.7
- cisco / catalyst_sd-wan_manager / 17.2.8
- cisco / catalyst_sd-wan_manager / 17.2.9
Matched remediation archetype
Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption
This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.
Check exposure
- Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
- Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
- Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.
Remediate safely
- Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
- Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
- Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.
Authoritative sources
Complete CVE record and remediation plan
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