CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2021-0289 — Juniper Junos security vulnerability

Medium CVSS 6.5

When user-defined ARP Policer is configured and applied on one or more Aggregated Ethernet (AE) interface units, a Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition vulnerability between the Device Control Daemon (DCD) and firewall process (dfwd) daemons of Juniper Networks Junos OS allows an attacker to bypass the user-defined ARP Policer. In this particular case the User ARP policer is replaced with default ARP policer. To review the desired ARP Policers and actual state one can run the command "show interfaces <> extensive" and review the output. See further details below. An example output is: show interfaces extensive | match policer Policer: Input: __default_arp_policer__ <<< incorrect if user ARP Policer was applied on an AE interface and the default ARP Policer is displayed Policer: Input: jtac-arp-ae5.317-inet-arp <<< correct if user ARP Policer was applied on an AE interface For all platforms, except SRX Series: This issue affects Juniper Networks Junos OS: All versions 5.6R1 and all later versions prior to 18.4 versions prior to 18.4R2-S9, 18.4R3-S9 with the exception of 15.1 versions 15.1R7-S10 and later versions; 19.4 versions prior to 19.4R3-S3; 20.1 versions prior t…

Severity
Medium
CVSS
6.5 (3.1)
Published
2021-07-15
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
operating-system
Weaknesses
CWE-367

Affected products

  • juniper / junos
  • juniper / junos / 5.6
  • juniper / junos / 18.4

Showing 3 representative product identities from 125 source matches. Confirm exact affected versions with the linked vendor and NVD evidence.

Matched remediation archetype

Race condition, TOCTOU, and lifecycle synchronization

This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.

Check exposure

  • Map concurrent actors, shared state, lock boundaries, signals, callbacks, retries, and check-then-use sequences in the affected path.
  • Determine whether untrusted users can influence timing, object names, filesystem state, or repeated state transitions.
  • Identify clustered and multi-process behavior that repository-local tests may not represent.

Remediate safely

  • Make the sensitive state transition atomic or protect it with a consistently ordered synchronization primitive.
  • Perform authorization and invariant checks on the same authoritative object and transaction used for the operation.
  • Use unique private resources, safe ownership transfer, and idempotent operations; add deterministic concurrency regression tests.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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