CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2020-3283 — Cisco Firepower Threat Defense security vulnerability

High CVSS 8.6

A vulnerability in the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)/Transport Layer Security (TLS) handler of Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software when running on the Cisco Firepower 1000 Series platform could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to trigger a denial of service (DoS) condition on an affected device. The vulnerability is due to a communication error between internal functions. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted SSL/TLS message to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a buffer underrun, which leads to a crash. The crash causes the affected device to reload.

Severity
High
CVSS
8.6 (3.1)
Published
2020-05-06
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
software/application
Weaknesses
CWE-119, CWE-787

Affected products

  • cisco / firepower_threat_defense
  • cisco / asa_5505_firmware / 9.12(2.12)
  • cisco / asa_5505_firmware / 9.13(0.33)
  • cisco / asa_5510_firmware / 9.12(2.12)
  • cisco / asa_5510_firmware / 9.13(0.33)
  • cisco / asa_5512-x_firmware / 9.12(2.12)

Showing 6 representative product identities from 25 source matches. Confirm exact affected versions with the linked vendor and NVD evidence.

Matched remediation archetype

Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption

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Check exposure

  • Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
  • Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
  • Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
  • Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
  • Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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