CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2020-26913 — Certain NETGEAR devices are affected by a stack-based buffer overflow by an authenticated user

Medium CVSS 6.8

Certain NETGEAR devices are affected by a stack-based buffer overflow by an authenticated user. This affects D6100 before 1.0.0.63, R7800 before 1.0.2.60, R8900 before 1.0.4.26, R9000 before 1.0.4.26, RBK20 before 2.3.0.28, RBR20 before 2.3.0.28, RBS20 before 2.3.0.28, RBK50 before 2.3.0.32, RBR50 before 2.3.0.32, RBS50 before 2.3.0.32, RBK40 before 2.3.0.28, RBR40 before 2.3.0.28, RBS40 before 2.3.0.28, SRK60 before 2.2.2.20, SRR60 before 2.2.2.20, SRS60 before 2.2.2.20, WN3000RPv2 before 1.0.0.78, WNDR4300v2 before 1.0.0.58, WNDR4500v3 before 1.0.0.58, WNR2000v5 before 1.0.0.70, XR450 before 2.3.2.40, and XR500 before 2.3.2.40.

Severity
Medium
CVSS
6.8 (3.1)
Published
2020-10-09
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
operating-system
Weaknesses
CWE-787

Affected products

  • netgear / d6100_firmware
  • netgear / r7800_firmware
  • netgear / r8900_firmware
  • netgear / r9000_firmware
  • netgear / rbk20_firmware
  • netgear / rbr20_firmware

Showing 6 representative product identities from 21 source matches. Confirm exact affected versions with the linked vendor and NVD evidence.

Matched remediation archetype

Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption

This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.

Check exposure

  • Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
  • Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
  • Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
  • Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
  • Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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