CVE intelligence and bounded remediation
CVE-2020-26250 — OAuthenticator is an OAuth login mechanism for JupyterHub
OAuthenticator is an OAuth login mechanism for JupyterHub. In oauthenticator from version 0.12.0 and before 0.12.2, the deprecated (in jupyterhub 1.2) configuration `Authenticator.whitelist`, which should be transparently mapped to `Authenticator.allowed_users` with a warning, is instead ignored by OAuthenticator classes, resulting in the same behavior as if this configuration has not been set. If this is the only mechanism of authorization restriction (i.e. no group or team restrictions in configuration) then all authenticated users will be allowed. Provider-based restrictions, including deprecated values such as `GitHubOAuthenticator.org_whitelist` are **not** affected. All users of OAuthenticator 0.12.0 and 0.12.1 with JupyterHub 1.2 (JupyterHub Helm chart 0.10.0-0.10.5) who use the `admin.whitelist.users` configuration in the jupyterhub helm chart or the `c.Authenticator.whitelist` configuration directly. Users of other deprecated configuration, e.g. `c.GitHubOAuthenticator.team_whitelist` are **not** affected. If you see a log line like this and expect a specific list of allowed usernames: "[I 2020-11-27 16:51:54.528 JupyterHub app:1717] Not using allowed_users. Any authentic…
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS
- 6.3 (3.1)
- Published
- 2020-12-01
- CISA KEV
- Not currently listed
- Ecosystem
- software/application
- Weaknesses
- CWE-863
Affected products
- jupyter / oauthenticator
Matched remediation archetype
Authorization bypass, IDOR, and cross-tenant access
This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.
Check exposure
- Map object and action authorization checks across API, UI, batch, import/export, and background-job paths.
- Identify tenant, ownership, role, and policy boundaries for affected resources and administrative operations.
- Use synthetic fixtures to compare intended access matrices without accessing another user's real data.
Remediate safely
- Enforce server-side authorization at each resource access and state transition using the authenticated principal and trusted tenant context.
- Scope data queries by tenant and ownership; treat client-supplied identifiers, roles, and policy claims as untrusted.
- Add deny-by-default policy tests for horizontal and vertical access across every affected transport.
Authoritative sources
Complete CVE record and remediation plan
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