CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2020-1866 — There is an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in several products

Medium CVSS 6.5

There is an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in several products. The software reads data past the end of the intended buffer when parsing certain crafted DHCP messages. Successful exploit could cause certain service abnormal. Affected product versions include:NIP6800 versions V500R001C30,V500R001C60SPC500,V500R005C00;S12700 versions V200R008C00;S2700 versions V200R008C00;S5700 versions V200R008C00;S6700 versions V200R008C00;S7700 versions V200R008C00;S9700 versions V200R008C00;Secospace USG6600 versions V500R001C30SPC200,V500R001C30SPC600,V500R001C60SPC500,V500R005C00;USG9500 versions V500R001C30SPC300,V500R001C30SPC600,V500R001C60SPC500,V500R005C00.

Severity
Medium
CVSS
6.5 (3.1)
Published
2021-01-13
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
operating-system
Weaknesses
CWE-125

Affected products

  • huawei / nip6800_firmware / v500r001c30
  • huawei / nip6800_firmware / v500r001c60spc500
  • huawei / nip6800_firmware / v500r005c00
  • huawei / s12700_firmware / v200r008c00
  • huawei / s2700_firmware / v200r008c00
  • huawei / s5700_firmware / v200r008c00

Showing 6 representative product identities from 17 source matches. Confirm exact affected versions with the linked vendor and NVD evidence.

Matched remediation archetype

Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption

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Check exposure

  • Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
  • Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
  • Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
  • Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
  • Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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