CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2020-15137 — All versions of HoRNDIS are affected by an integer overflow in the RNDIS packet parsing routines

Medium CVSS 5.9

All versions of HoRNDIS are affected by an integer overflow in the RNDIS packet parsing routines. A malicious USB device can trigger disclosure of unrelated kernel memory to userspace applications on the host, or can cause the kernel to crash. Kernel memory disclosure is especially likely on 32-bit kernels; 64-bit kernels are more likely to crash on attempted exploitation. It is not believed that kernel memory corruption is possible, or that unattended kernel memory disclosure without the collaboration of a userspace program running on the host is possible. The vulnerability is in `HoRNDIS::receivePacket`. `msg_len`, `data_ofs`, and `data_len` can be controlled by an attached USB device, and a negative value of `data_ofs` can bypass the check for `(data_ofs + data_len + 8) > msg_len`, and subsequently can cause a wild pointer copy in the `mbuf_copyback` call. The software is not maintained and no patches are planned. Users of multi-tenant systems with HoRNDIS installed should only connect trusted USB devices to their system.

Severity
Medium
CVSS
5.9 (3.1)
Published
2020-08-12
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
software/application
Weaknesses
CWE-190

Affected products

  • horndis_project / horndis

Matched remediation archetype

Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption

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Check exposure

  • Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
  • Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
  • Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
  • Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
  • Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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