CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2020-14382 — Cryptsetup Project Cryptsetup security vulnerability

High CVSS 7.8

A vulnerability was found in upstream release cryptsetup-2.2.0 where, there's a bug in LUKS2 format validation code, that is effectively invoked on every device/image presenting itself as LUKS2 container. The bug is in segments validation code in file 'lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c' in function hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj) where the code does not check for possible overflow on memory allocation used for intervals array (see statement "intervals = malloc(first_backup * sizeof(*intervals));"). Due to the bug, library can be *tricked* to expect such allocation was successful but for far less memory then originally expected. Later it may read data FROM image crafted by an attacker and actually write such data BEYOND allocated memory.

Severity
High
CVSS
7.8 (3.1)
Published
2020-09-16
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
software/application
Weaknesses
CWE-787

Affected products

  • cryptsetup_project / cryptsetup / 2.2.0
  • redhat / enterprise_linux / 8.0
  • canonical / ubuntu_linux / 20.04
  • fedoraproject / fedora / 31
  • fedoraproject / fedora / 33

Matched remediation archetype

Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption

This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.

Check exposure

  • Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
  • Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
  • Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
  • Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
  • Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

The detailed catalog view below loads this exact record, its source evidence, and the full seven-phase agentic change plan.