CVE intelligence and bounded remediation
CVE-2019-5186 — An exploitable stack buffer overflow vulnerability vulnerability exists in the iocheckd service "I/O-Check" functionality of WAGO PFC 200
An exploitable stack buffer overflow vulnerability vulnerability exists in the iocheckd service "I/O-Check" functionality of WAGO PFC 200. An attacker can send a specially crafted packet to trigger the parsing of this cache file.At 0x1eb9c the extracted interface element name from the xml file is used as an argument to /etc/config-tools/config_interfaces interface=<contents of interface element> using sprintf(). The destination buffer sp+0x40 is overflowed with the call to sprintf() for any interface values that are greater than 512-len("/etc/config-tools/config_interfaces interface=") in length. Later, at 0x1ea08 strcpy() is used to copy the contents of the stack buffer that was overflowed sp+0x40 into sp+0x440. The buffer sp+0x440 is immediately adjacent to sp+0x40 on the stack. Therefore, there is no NULL termination on the buffer sp+0x40 since it overflowed into sp+0x440. The strcpy() will result in invalid memory access. An interface value of length 0x3c4 will cause the service to crash.
- Severity
- High
- CVSS
- 7 (3.1)
- Published
- 2020-03-23
- CISA KEV
- Not currently listed
- Ecosystem
- operating-system
- Weaknesses
- CWE-120, CWE-787
Affected products
- wago / pfc200_firmware / 03.02.02(14)
Matched remediation archetype
Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption
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Check exposure
- Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
- Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
- Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.
Remediate safely
- Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
- Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
- Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.
Authoritative sources
Complete CVE record and remediation plan
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