CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2019-5185 — An exploitable stack buffer overflow vulnerability vulnerability exists in the iocheckd service "I/O-Check" functionality of WAGO PFC 200

High CVSS 7

An exploitable stack buffer overflow vulnerability vulnerability exists in the iocheckd service "I/O-Check" functionality of WAGO PFC 200. An attacker can send a specially crafted packet to trigger the parsing of this cache file. At 0x1ea28 the extracted state value from the xml file is used as an argument to /etc/config-tools/config_interfaces interface=X1 state=<contents of state node> using sprintf(). The destination buffer sp+0x40 is overflowed with the call to sprintf() for any state values that are greater than 512-len("/etc/config-tools/config_interfaces interface=X1 state=") in length. Later, at 0x1ea08 strcpy() is used to copy the contents of the stack buffer that was overflowed sp+0x40 into sp+0x440. The buffer sp+0x440 is immediately adjacent to sp+0x40 on the stack. Therefore, there is no NULL termination on the buffer sp+0x40 since it overflowed into sp+0x440. The strcpy() will result in invalid memory access. An state value of length 0x3c9 will cause the service to crash.

Severity
High
CVSS
7 (3.1)
Published
2020-03-23
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
operating-system
Weaknesses
CWE-787

Affected products

  • wago / pfc200_firmware / 03.02.02(14)

Matched remediation archetype

Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption

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Check exposure

  • Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
  • Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
  • Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
  • Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
  • Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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