CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2018-1992 — Ibm Power System S922 (9009-22A) Firmware security vulnerability

Medium CVSS 6.9

The IBM Power 9 OP910, OP920, and FW910 boot firmware's bootloader is responsible for loading and validating the initial boot firmware image that drives the rest of the system's hardware initialization. The bootloader firmware contains a buffer overflow vulnerability such that, if an attacker were able to replace the initial boot firmware image with a very carefully crafted and sufficiently large, malicious replacement, it could cause the bootloader, during the load of that image, to overwrite its own instruction memory and circumvent secure boot protections, install trojans, etc. IBM X-Force ID: 154345.

Severity
Medium
CVSS
6.9 (2.0)
Published
2019-03-21
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
operating-system
Weaknesses
CWE-119

Affected products

  • ibm / power_system_s922_(9009-22a)_firmware
  • ibm / power_system_h922_(9223-22h)_firmware
  • ibm / power_system_s914_(9009-41a)_firmware
  • ibm / power_system_s924_(9009-42a)_firmware
  • ibm / power_system_h924_(9223-42h)_firmware
  • ibm / power_system_l922_(9008-22l)_firmware

Showing 6 representative product identities from 11 source matches. Confirm exact affected versions with the linked vendor and NVD evidence.

Matched remediation archetype

Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption

This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.

Check exposure

  • Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
  • Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
  • Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
  • Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
  • Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

The detailed catalog view below loads this exact record, its source evidence, and the full seven-phase agentic change plan.