CVE intelligence and bounded remediation
CVE-2018-0314 — Cisco Nexus 7000 Firmware security vulnerability
A vulnerability in the Cisco Fabric Services (CFS) component of Cisco FXOS Software and Cisco NX-OS Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on an affected device. The vulnerability exists because the affected software insufficiently validates Cisco Fabric Services packet headers when the software processes packet data. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a maliciously crafted Cisco Fabric Services packet to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a buffer overflow condition on the device, which could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the device. This vulnerability affects the following if configured to use Cisco Fabric Services: Firepower 4100 Series Next-Generation Firewalls, Firepower 9300 Security Appliance, MDS 9000 Series Multilayer Switches, Nexus 2000 Series Fabric Extenders, Nexus 3000 Series Switches, Nexus 3500 Platform Switches, Nexus 5500 Platform Switches, Nexus 5600 Platform Switches, Nexus 6000 Series Switches, Nexus 7000 Series Switches, Nexus 7700 Series Switches, Nexus 9000 Series Switches in standalone NX-OS mode, Nexus 9500 R-Series Line Cards and Fab…
- Severity
- Critical
- CVSS
- 9.8 (3.0)
- Published
- 2018-06-20
- CISA KEV
- Not currently listed
- Ecosystem
- operating-system
- Weaknesses
- CWE-20, CWE-119
Affected products
- cisco / nexus_7000_firmware / 7.3(2)d1(0.49)
- cisco / nexus_7000_firmware / 8.0(1)
- cisco / nexus_7000_firmware / 8.1(0.112)s0
- cisco / nexus_5000_firmware / 7.0(0)hsk(0.357)
- cisco / nexus_5000_firmware / 8.1(0.2)s0
- cisco / nexus_5000_firmware / 8.8(0.1)
Matched remediation archetype
Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption
This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.
Check exposure
- Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
- Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
- Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.
Remediate safely
- Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
- Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
- Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.
Authoritative sources
Complete CVE record and remediation plan
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