CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2018-0303 — Cisco Nx-Os security vulnerability

High CVSS 8.8

A vulnerability in the Cisco Discovery Protocol component of Cisco FXOS Software and Cisco NX-OS Software could allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to execute arbitrary code as root or cause a denial of service (DoS) condition on the affected device. The vulnerability exists because of insufficiently validated Cisco Discovery Protocol packet headers. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted Cisco Discovery Protocol packet to a Layer 2 adjacent affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a buffer overflow that could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code as root or cause a DoS condition on the affected device. This vulnerability affects the following if configured to use Cisco Discovery Protocol: Firepower 4100 Series Next-Generation Firewalls, Firepower 9300 Security Appliance, MDS 9000 Series Multilayer Switches, Nexus 1000V Series Switches, Nexus 1100 Series Cloud Services Platforms, Nexus 2000 Series Fabric Extenders, Nexus 3000 Series Switches, Nexus 3500 Platform Switches, Nexus 5500 Platform Switches, Nexus 5600 Platform Switches, Nexus 6000 Series Switches, Nexus 7000 Series Switches, Nexus 7700 Series Switc…

Severity
High
CVSS
8.8 (3.0)
Published
2018-06-21
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
operating-system
Weaknesses
CWE-20, CWE-119

Affected products

  • cisco / nx-os / 7.0(0)hsk(0.357)
  • cisco / nx-os / 8.1(0.2)s0
  • cisco / nx-os / 8.8(0.1)
  • cisco / nx-os / 8.0(1)
  • cisco / nx-os / 8.8(3.5)s0
  • cisco / nx-os / 7.0(3)i4(7)

Showing 6 representative product identities from 24 source matches. Confirm exact affected versions with the linked vendor and NVD evidence.

Matched remediation archetype

Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption

This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.

Check exposure

  • Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
  • Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
  • Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
  • Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
  • Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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