CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2018-0102 — Cisco Nx-Os security vulnerability

High CVSS 7.4

A vulnerability in the Pong tool of Cisco NX-OS Software could allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to cause a reload of an affected device, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. The vulnerability exists because the affected software attempts to free the same area of memory twice. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a pong request to an affected device from a location on the network that causes the pong reply packet to egress both a FabricPath port and a non-FabricPath port. An exploit could allow the attacker to cause a dual or quad supervisor virtual port-channel (vPC) to reload. This vulnerability affects the following products when running Cisco NX-OS Software Release 7.2(1)D(1), 7.2(2)D1(1), or 7.2(2)D1(2) with both the Pong and FabricPath features enabled and the FabricPath port is actively monitored via a SPAN session: Cisco Nexus 7000 Series Switches and Cisco Nexus 7700 Series Switches. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCuv98660.

Severity
High
CVSS
7.4 (3.0)
Published
2018-01-18
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
operating-system
Weaknesses
CWE-399, CWE-415

Affected products

  • cisco / nx-os / 7.2(1)d(1)
  • cisco / nx-os / 7.2(2)d1(1)
  • cisco / nx-os / 7.2(2)d1(2)

Matched remediation archetype

Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption

This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.

Check exposure

  • Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
  • Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
  • Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
  • Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
  • Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

The detailed catalog view below loads this exact record, its source evidence, and the full seven-phase agentic change plan.