CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2017-8410 — An issue was discovered on D-Link DCS-1100 and DCS-1130 devices

Critical CVSS 9.8

An issue was discovered on D-Link DCS-1100 and DCS-1130 devices. The binary rtspd in /sbin folder of the device handles all the rtsp connections received by the device. It seems that the binary performs a memcpy operation at address 0x00011E34 with the value sent in the "Authorization: Basic" RTSP header and stores it on the stack. The number of bytes to be copied are calculated based on the length of the string sent in the RTSP header by the client. As a result, memcpy copies more data then it can hold on stack and this results in corrupting the registers for the caller function sub_F6CC which results in memory corruption. The severity of this attack is enlarged by the fact that the same value is then copied on the stack in the function 0x00011378 and this allows to overflow the buffer allocated and thus control the PC register which will result in arbitrary code execution on the device.

Severity
Critical
CVSS
9.8 (3.1)
Published
2019-07-02
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
operating-system
Weaknesses
CWE-119

Affected products

  • dlink / dcs-1100_firmware
  • dlink / dcs-1130_firmware

Matched remediation archetype

Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption

This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.

Check exposure

  • Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
  • Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
  • Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
  • Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
  • Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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