CVE intelligence and bounded remediation

CVE-2017-3223 — Dahuasecurity Ip Camera Firmware security vulnerability

Critical CVSS 9.8

Dahua IP camera products using firmware versions prior to V2.400.0000.14.R.20170713 include a version of the Sonia web interface that may be vulnerable to a stack buffer overflow. Dahua IP camera products include an application known as Sonia (/usr/bin/sonia) that provides the web interface and other services for controlling the IP camera remotely. Versions of Sonia included in firmware versions prior to DH_IPC-Consumer-Zi-Themis_Eng_P_V2.408.0000.11.R.20170621 do not validate input data length for the 'password' field of the web interface. A remote, unauthenticated attacker may submit a crafted POST request to the IP camera's Sonia web interface that may lead to out-of-bounds memory operations and loss of availability or remote code execution. The issue was originally identified by the researcher in firmware version DH_IPC-HX1X2X-Themis_EngSpnFrn_N_V2.400.0000.30.R.20160803.

Severity
Critical
CVSS
9.8 (3.0)
Published
2018-07-24
CISA KEV
Not currently listed
Ecosystem
operating-system
Weaknesses
CWE-121, CWE-119

Affected products

  • dahuasecurity / ip_camera_firmware

Showing 1 representative product identities from 2 source matches. Confirm exact affected versions with the linked vendor and NVD evidence.

Matched remediation archetype

Buffer bounds, memory safety, and memory corruption

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Check exposure

  • Identify affected native-code versions, build flags, architectures, parsers, codecs, drivers, and input paths in all shipped artifacts.
  • Determine whether untrusted data reaches the affected routine and the process privilege, sandbox, and network exposure.
  • Confirm statically linked, vendored, firmware, and platform-provided copies, not only package-manager records.

Remediate safely

  • Apply the maintained upstream correction or replace the affected component, then rebuild every dependent artifact from clean inputs.
  • Adopt bounds-checked interfaces, validated sizes and integer conversions, clear ownership, and memory-safe components where practical.
  • Enable supported compiler and runtime hardening and add sanitized tests and fuzz regression seeds derived from non-weaponized fixtures.

Authoritative sources

Complete CVE record and remediation plan

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