CVE intelligence and bounded remediation
CVE-2016-5736 — F5 Big-Ip Application Acceleration Manager security vulnerability
The default configuration of the IPsec IKE peer listener in F5 BIG-IP LTM, Analytics, APM, ASM, and Link Controller 11.2.1 before HF16, 11.4.x, 11.5.x before 11.5.4 HF2, 11.6.x before 11.6.1, and 12.x before 12.0.0 HF2; BIG-IP AAM, AFM, and PEM 11.4.x, 11.5.x before 11.5.4 HF2, 11.6.x before 11.6.1, and 12.x before 12.0.0 HF2; BIG-IP DNS 12.x before 12.0.0 HF2; BIG-IP Edge Gateway, WebAccelerator, and WOM 11.2.1 before HF16; BIG-IP GTM 11.2.1 before HF16, 11.4.x, 11.5.x before 11.5.4 HF2, and 11.6.x before 11.6.1; and BIG-IP PSM 11.4.0 through 11.4.1 improperly enables the anonymous IPsec IKE peer configuration object, which allows remote attackers to establish an IKE Phase 1 negotiation and possibly conduct brute-force attacks against Phase 2 negotiations via unspecified vectors.
- Severity
- High
- CVSS
- 7.5 (3.0)
- Published
- 2016-08-19
- CISA KEV
- Not currently listed
- Ecosystem
- software/application
- Weaknesses
- CWE-284
Affected products
- f5 / big-ip_application_acceleration_manager / 11.4.0
- f5 / big-ip_application_acceleration_manager / 11.4.1
- f5 / big-ip_application_acceleration_manager / 11.5.0
- f5 / big-ip_application_acceleration_manager / 11.5.1
- f5 / big-ip_application_acceleration_manager / 11.5.2
- f5 / big-ip_application_acceleration_manager / 11.5.3
Matched remediation archetype
Authorization bypass, IDOR, and cross-tenant access
This catalog composition supplies bounded fallback guidance. Explicitly reviewed curated workflows load with the complete record below.
Check exposure
- Map object and action authorization checks across API, UI, batch, import/export, and background-job paths.
- Identify tenant, ownership, role, and policy boundaries for affected resources and administrative operations.
- Use synthetic fixtures to compare intended access matrices without accessing another user's real data.
Remediate safely
- Enforce server-side authorization at each resource access and state transition using the authenticated principal and trusted tenant context.
- Scope data queries by tenant and ownership; treat client-supplied identifiers, roles, and policy claims as untrusted.
- Add deny-by-default policy tests for horizontal and vertical access across every affected transport.
Authoritative sources
Complete CVE record and remediation plan
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